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Abstract. We discuss a family of models expressed by nonlinear differential equation systems describing
closed market societies in the presence of taxation and redistribution. We focus in particular on three
example models obtained in correspondence to different parameter choices. We analyse the influence of
the various choices on the long time shape of the income distribution. Several simulations suggest that
behavioral heterogeneity among the individuals plays a definite role in the formation of fat tails of the
asymptotic stationary distributions. This is in agreement with results found with different approaches and
techniques. We also show that an excellent fit for the computational outputs of our models is provided by
the κ-generalized distribution introduced by Kaniadakis in [14].
1 Introduction
Several papers have been published, especially during the
last decade, which aim at explaining some universal fea-
tures of income and wealth distributions with the tools
of statistical mechanics and kinetic theory. We recall for
example [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and refer to [6] or [7] for a
detailed review and bibliography. The models described
in most of these papers typically concern closed market
societies in which wealth exchanges obeying some given
rule and involving pairs of agents take place. The chal-
lenge is to derive from the knowledge of the microscopic
interactions the emergence of collective patterns similar
to those observed in the real world. The techniques more
frequently employed take advantage of today’s computer
power and include Monte Carlo methods and agent based
or numerical simulations.
In a recent work [8] belonging to this research line the
authors of this note investigated a family of models for
the taxation and redistribution process, formulated within
a general framework proposed in [9]. The models at is-
sue are expressed by systems of nonlinear ordinary dif-
ferential equations, which enjoy a great descriptive flexi-
bility thanks to the presence of various parameters. The
equation systems are well beyond analytic solution. Never-
theless, many computational simulations give evidence of
the existence of asymptotic stationary distributions whose
higher income sections exhibit, at least for some choices
of the model parameters, a power law like decreasing be-
havior. Together with other aspects discussed in [8] and
[9], this fact encourages to pursue the study of these mod-
els. Indeed, as well known after Pareto observation of more
than a century ago [10], often in real economies the wealth
Send offprint requests to:
distribution of the richest people follows a power law pat-
tern.1
In particular, the question arises of what is within the
framework and the models introduced in [8] the cause of
the detected decreasing behavior. This is the first question
addressed in this paper. A mechanism responsible for the
appearence of a power law tail was recognized in [11] and
[4] for a class of kinetic wealth exchange models to be the
so called saving propensity, a parameter expressing the at-
titude of agents to retain, when trading, a certain fraction
of their wealth. An analysis of the influence on the shape of
the distribution of homogeneous and heterogeneous (i.e.,
equal or diversified) saving propensity among agents of a
population can be found also in [12], where various ki-
netic wealth exchange models of both types are surveyed.
Furthermore, in [13] a rigorous analytic investigation is
carried out for a class of conservative economy models de-
scribed by a (continuous) Boltzmann-like equation, which
proves in particular that randomness in the microscopic
trade and saving propensity play a significant role in the
large wealth behavior of the steady distributions.
Taking advantage of the high flexibility which charac-
terizes the models in [8], we give account below of several
numerical simulations run in correspondence to various
choices of parameters. Modulo the different model formu-
lation, these simulations suggest, in substantial agreement
with the above mentioned references, that an heteroge-
neous saving propensity is a crucial ingredient for the fat-
ness of the large wealth part of the stationary distribution.
A second point in this paper concerns the attempt to
find the analytical expression of a multi-parameter func-
tion with which to fit the equilibrium distributions ob-
1 The words income and wealth are used in this paper to
designate the same concept.
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tained via numerical simulations. Various possibilities sug-
gested in the literature are briefly recalled in Section 4. A
comparison among them singles out the κ-generalized dis-
tribution introduced and discussed in [14], [15] and [16] as
especially suitable to fit at a time the computational out-
puts relative to the poorest, average and richest income
values of the asymptotic distributions of our models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we re-
call the general framework introduced in [9] and discuss a
family of models which enjoy minor changes with respect
to the one in [8]. In Section 3 we particularize the models,
by choosing three specific sets of values for their parame-
ters and we focus on the effect produced by the different
choices on the shape of the asymptotic income distribu-
tions. In the same section we also review and shortly com-
pare some other wealth exchange models discussed in the
econophysics literature. In Section 4 we extend the atten-
tion to the lower income parts of the asymptotic income
distributions found and we show, for each of the models
of the previous section, how the “numerical”distributions
fit with suitably tuned κ-generalized distributions. Some
remarks on reversibility can be found in Section 5. In Sec-
tion 6 the results are summarized and discussed within a
critical perspective.
2 The general framework and a model family
Consider a population of individuals divided into a finite
number n of classes, each one characterized by its average
income. Let r1, r2 . . . rn denote the average incomes of the
n classes, ordered so that r1 ≤ r2 ≤ . . . ≤ rn, and let
xi(t), where xi : R → [0,+∞) for i ∈ Γn = {1, 2, ..., n},
denote the fraction at time t of individuals belonging to
the i-th class. In the following, the indices i, j, h, k, etc.
always belong to Γn, if no differently stated.
Assume that pairwise interactions of economic nature,
subjected to taxation, take place. And call S the fixed
amount of money that people may exchange during their
interactions.
Any time an individual of the h-th class has to pay a
quantity S to an individual of the k-th class, this one in
turn has to pay some tax corresponding to a percentage of
what he is receiving. This tax is quantified as S τ , with the
tax rate τ = τk ≤ 1 depending in general on the class of
the earning individual. Since the quantity S τ goes to the
government, which is supposed to use the money collected
through taxation to provide welfare services for the popu-
lation, we interpret the welfare provision as an income re-
distribution. Ignoring the passages to and from the govern-
ment, we adopt the following equivalent mechanism as the
mover of the dynamics: in correspondence to any interac-
tion between an h-individual and a k-individual, where the
one who has to pay S to the other one is the h-individual,
this pays to the k-individual a quantity S (1 − τ) and he
pays as well a quantity S τ , which is divided among all j-
individuals for j 6= n.2 Accordingly, the effect of taxation
2 The reason why individuals of the n-th class constitute an
exception is a technical one: if an individual of the n-th class
and redistribution is equivalent to the effect of a quantity
of interactions between the h-individual and each one of
the j-individuals for j 6= n, which are “induced”by the
effective h-k interaction. To fix notations, we may distin-
guish between direct interactions (h-k) and indirect inter-
actions (h-j for j 6= n).
Any direct or indirect economical interaction yields as
a consequence a possible slight increase or slight decrease
of the income of individuals.
To translate into mathematical terms all that, we in-
troduce
- the (table of the) interaction rates
ηhk ∈ [0,+∞) ,
expressing the number of effective encounters per unit
time between individuals of the h-th class and individuals
of the k-th class;
- the (tables of the) direct transition probability den-
sities
Cihk ∈ [0,+∞) ,
satisfying for any fixed h and k
n∑
i=1
Cihk = 1 ,
which express the probability density that an individual
of the h-th class will belong to the i-th class after a direct
interaction with an individual of the k-th class;
- the (tables of the) indirect transition variation den-
sities
T i[hk] : R
n → R ,
where the T i[hk](x) with x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rn are contin-
uous functions, satisfying, for any fixed h, k and x ∈ Rn
n∑
i=1
T i[hk](x) = 0 .
These functions account for the indirect interactions and
express the variation density in the i-th class due to an
interaction between an individual of the h-th class with
an individual of the k-th class.
Chose for simplicity all the interactions rates ηhk to
be equal to 1, which corresponds to assuming that all the
encounters between two individuals occur with the same
frequency, independently of the classes to which the two
belong.
Then, the evolution of the class populations xi(t) is
governed by the following differential equations, in which
the contribution of both direct and indirect interactions is
present:
dxi
dt
=
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
(
Cihk + T
i
[hk](x)
)
xhxk − xi
n∑
k=1
xk . (1)
would receive some money, the possibility would arise for him
to advance to a higher class, which is impossible.
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In order to design within the general framework (1) a
specific model (or a specific family of models), we need to
further characterize the expressions of the direct transi-
tion probability densities Cihk and the indirect transition
variation densities T i[hk](x). A conceivable choice is given
next.
We represent the direct transition probability densities
Cihk as
Cihk = a
i
hk + b
i
hk ,
where the term aihk expresses the probability density that
an h-individual will belong to the i-th class after an en-
counter with a k-individual, when such an encounter does
not produce any change of class and the term bihk expresses
the density variation in the i-th class of an h-individual
interacting with a k-individual.
Accordingly, the only nonzero elements aihk are
aiij = 1 .
To define the elements bihk, we introduce the matrix
P , whose elements ph,k express the probability that in an
encounter between an h-individual and a k-individual, the
one who pays is the h-individual. In view of the possibil-
ity that to some extent the two individuals do not really
interact, the ph,k are required to satisfy 0 ≤ ph,k ≤ 1 and,
of course, ph,k + pk,h ≤ 1. Apart from that, there is a
certain arbitrariness in the construction of the matrix P .
The only additional requirement is to put each element
in the first row, as well as each element but the very last
one in the last column, equal to zero. The reason for that
is the non existence of a class lower than the first nor a
class higher than the n-th: we cannot admit the possi-
bility for 1-individuals [respectively, for n-individuals] to
move back to a lower class [respectively, to advance, pass-
ing in a higher class]. Observing that in the presence of
interactions between two individuals of the same class, the
average wealth of the two remains the same if we only keep
into account the direct transition, and may only change
because of the taxation and redistribution contributions,
we assume that individuals of class 1 never pay. We also
assume that individuals of class n never receive money
An encounter between an h-individual and a k-indi-
vidual where h 6= k, with h ≥ 2 and k ≤ n − 1 and the
h-individual paying, produces the elements3
bh−1hk = ph,k S
1− τk
rh − rh−1 , b
h
hk = −ph,k S
1− τk
rh − rh−1 ,
bk+1kh = ph,k S
1− τk
rk+1 − rk , b
k
kh = −ph,k S
1− τk
rk+1 − rk .
Hence, the possibly nonzero elements bihk are of the form
bii+1,k = pi+1,k S
1− τk
ri+1 − ri ,
bii,k = − pk,i S
1− τi
ri+1 − ri − pi,k S
1− τk
ri − ri−1 ,
bii−1,k = pk,i−1 S
1− τi−1
ri − ri−1 , (2)
3 Since the classes are characterized by an average income,
the terms bihh are equal to zero for any h and i.
where the expression for bii+1,k in (2) holds true for i+1 6=
k, and for i ≤ n−1 and k ≤ n−1; in the expression for bii,k,
which is only present whenever i 6= k, the first addendum
is effectively present only provided i ≤ n−1 and k ≥ 2 and
the second addendum only provided i ≥ 2 and k ≤ n− 1,
and the expression for bii−1,k holds true for for i− 1 6= k,
and for i ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2.
We express the indirect transition variation densities
T i[hk](x) as
T i[hk](x) = U
i
[hk](x) + V
i
[hk](x) ,
where
U i[hk](x) =
ph,k S τk∑n
j=1 xj
(
xi−1
ri − ri−1 −
xi
ri+1 − ri
)
(3)
represents the variation density corresponding to the ad-
vancement from a class to the subsequent one, due to the
benefit of taxation and
V i[hk](x) = ph,k S τk
(
δh,i+1
rh − ri −
δh,i
rh − ri−1
) ∑n−1
j=1 xj∑n
j=1 xj
,
(4)
with δh,k denoting the Kronecker delta, accounts for the
variation density corresponding to the retrocession from
a class to the preceding one, due to the payment of some
tax. In the r.h.s. of (3) and (4), h > 1 and the terms
involving the index i−1 [respectively, i+1] are effectively
present only provided i− 1 ≥ 1 [respectively, i+ 1 ≤ n].
Notice that for technical reasons, in the model under
consideration, the effective amount of money paid as tax
relative to an exchange of S(1 − τk) between two indi-
viduals and then redistributed among classes is given by
S τk (
∑n−1
j=1 xj)/(
∑n
j=1 xj) instead of S τk.
A general theorem proved in [9] ensures that, with the
present choice of parameters, in correspondence to any
initial condition x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n), for which x0i ≥ 0 and∑n
i=0 x0i = 1, a unique solution x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t))
of (1) exists, which is defined for all t ∈ [0,+∞), satisfies
x(0) = x0 and also
xi(t) ≥ 0 for i ∈ Γn and
n∑
i=0
xi(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 . (5)
With reference to this well-posedness result, we observe
that in this context the only meaningful initial data, and
solutions as well, are those with non negative components.
Also, the constraint
∑n
i=0 xi0 = 1 expresses nothing but
a normalization. Hence, we conclude by (5) that the solu-
tions of interest are in fact distribution functions. Further-
more, we emphasize that in view of (5), the expressions of
the U i[hk](x) and V
i
[hk](x) in (3) and (4) can be simplified.
We may from now on consider, instead of (1), the sys-
tem of differential equations
dxi
dt
=
n∑
h=1
n∑
k=1
(
Cihk + T
i
[hk](x)
)
xhxk − xi , i ∈ Γn , (6)
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where the terms T i[hk](x) are linear in the variables xj .
The equations in (6) have a polynomial right hand side,
containing cubic terms as the highest degree ones.
Due to the fact that the value of n and the parameters
rk, τk, ph,k are still to be fixed, the equations (6) actually
describe a family of models rather than a single model.
3 Different choices of the parameters
We now exploit the flexibility which characterizes the equa-
tions (6) and take into consideration three different possi-
ble choices for the values of the parameters ph,k. Our aim
is to try and see what is the effect of such different choices
on the shape of the large wealth part of the asymptotic
income distribution.
3.1 Three different cases
In each of the three considered cases we take the elements
of the matrix P lying on the main diagonal, those on the
first row and those on the n-th column to be equal to zero:
pj,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., n} ,
p1,k = 0 for k ∈ {1, ..., n} ,
ph,n = 0 for h ∈ {1, ..., n} .
Apart from that, we define the ph,k
• in a first case,
which we’ll call the Case FSP,
(FSP for fixed saving propensity),
as
ph,k = (1/4) rh/rn
with the exception of the terms
ph,1 = (1/2) rh/rn for h ∈ {2, ..., n} ,
pn,k = 1/2 for k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} ;
• in a second case,
which we’ll call the Case TID,
(TID for trading individuals dependence),
as
ph,k = (1/4) min{rh, rk}/rn
with the exception of the terms
ph,1 = (1/2) r1/rn for h ∈ {2, ..., n} ,
pn,k = (1/2) rk/rn for k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} ;
• in a third case,
which we’ll call the Case FAE,
(FAE for fixed amount exchange),
as
ph,k = 1/4
with the exception of the terms
ph,1 = 1/2 for h ∈ {2, ..., n} ,
pn,k = 1/2 for k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} ;
Choosing the ph,k as in the Case FSP amounts to as-
sume, in view of (2), that each individual (apart from
those belonging to the poorest and the richest class, for
which particular rules hold true) has the same saving pro-
pensity. Indeed, the frequency of interactions is uniform
and the effect of the mechanism described above is the
same as if in any trade each individual would pay a small
quantity proportional to her income, the proportion rate
being the same for everybody. Such a homogeneity in
spending and hence in saving is replaced by heterogeneity
both in the Cases TID and FAE. In particular, the Case
TID expresses the conjecture that, when two individuals
trade, the exchanged amount of money is proportional to
the wealth of the poorest of the two.
The average incomes rj and the taxations rates τj are
taken here to be given by rj = 10j and
τj = τmin +
j − 1
n− 1 (τmax − τmin) (7)
for j ∈ Γn, where τmin = 10/100 and τmax = 45/100.
According to the result of a large number of simu-
lations (see also [9] and [8]), once the value of n and the
parameters rj and τj are chosen, in correspondence to any
fixed value µ ∈ [r1, rn] of the global wealth a stationary
distribution exists, which is the asymptotic trend of all
solutions of (6) with initial conditions x0 = (x01, . . . , x0n)
satisfying x0i ≥ 0,
∑n
i=0 x0i = 1 and
∑n
i=1 rix0i = µ.
The influence on such distribution of the different in-
teraction rules relative to the Cases FSP, TID and FAE
is well illustrated by the Figures 1, 2, referring to the case
n = 25, just a sample among several similar ones. In each
of these figures two panels relative to the Case FSP in
the first row, two relative to the Case TID in the sec-
ond row, and two relative to the Case FAE in the third
row are reported. The panels on the left show the his-
tograms corresponding to an initial condition; the panels
on the right show the corresponding asymptotic station-
ary distribution. We point out here that the histograms
are scaled differently from panel to panel. The initial con-
ditions are chosen randomly within distributions for which
lower income classes contain a high percentage of individ-
uals, which seems to be a rather realistic assumption. In
each of the two figures they are taken to be the same
for the three simulations (each one referring to a differ-
ent model) precisely to emphasize the role played by the
different parameters in the formation of the shape of the
asymptotic distribution.
The Figures 1 and 2 suggest that a fat tail exists in
the Cases TID and FAE, and not in the Case FSP. As a
more, a log-log plot of the right section of the asymptotic
stationary distributions is in agreement with a power law
type decrease for the Cases TID and FAE, while this does
not happen in the Case FSP.
To gain some accuracy, we tried several simulations
in correspondence to a different choice of the average in-
comes: in particular, we took them to be nonlinear: rj =
10 (1, 67)j for j ∈ Γ25, so as to have r24/r15 ∼ 100. The
expectation was confirmed: no power law behavior is seen
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Fig. 1. Initial (on the left) and long-time equilibrium (on the right) distributions for the models at issue: the first row
refers to the Case FSP (fixed saving propensity), the second row to the Case TID (trading individuals dependence),
the third row to the Case FAE (fixed amount exchange). Notice that the histograms are scaled differently on different
pictures.
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Fig. 2. Initial (on the left) and long-time equilibrium (on the right) distributions for the models at issue: the first row
refers to the Case FSP (fixed saving propensity), the second row to the Case TID (trading individuals dependence),
the third row to the Case FAE (fixed amount exchange). Notice that the histograms are scaled differently on different
pictures.
in the Case FSP, while a clear straight line appears in the
log-log plots of the Cases TID and FAE. As a sample of
the result of several simulations, three log-log plots rela-
tives to the Cases FSP, TID and FAE are shown in Figure
3.
3.2 Some remarks on finding power laws
In general, simulations based on classes whose income val-
ues increase linearly do not allow a precise determination
of the tail of the equilibrium distribution. It is well known
(see e.g. [17]) that in real statistical data a fraction of less
than 2-3 % of the population has an income distributed
according to a power law. But a power law tail can be
clearly distinguished from an exponential tail only over
an income range of two or three magnitude orders. This
requires the introduction in our model of class incomes
growing more steeply than linearly; in this way the indi-
viduals of the 25-th class would not be, for instance, 25
times richer than those of the first class, but at least 1000
times richer.
In our previous work [8] we introduced for this pur-
pose class incomes which increase quadratically; in that
case the income of the 25-th class was 252 times larger
than the income of the first class. Notice that when the
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Fig. 3. The (suitably rescaled) log-log plots of the right section of asymptotic stationary distributions (in a case with
average incomes rj = 10 (1, 67)
j) in the three Cases: FSP, TID, and FAE. A clear straight line appears in the log-log
plots of the Cases TID and FAE, while this does not happen in the Case FSP.
class income ri is not linear in the i-th class, a rescaling of
the discrete distribution function xi is necessary, in order
to preserve the correct relation between the distribution
density and the cumulative income distribution [8]. It is
possible to check that the cumulative distribution
∑k
i=1 xi
computed explicitly from the simulations tends to coincide
for large k with the integral of the rescaled density, pro-
vided one also takes into account certain slight differences
in the normalization (the discrete incomes are normalized
as
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, while the rescaled density f(r) is normal-
ized as
∫∞
0
f(r)dr = 1).
In the simulations for the investigation described here
we employed, besides linear class incomes, incomes which
increase exponentially as ri = 10 (1, 67)
i. The basis 1.67
is chosen in such a way as to obtain an income increase
by a factor 100 when the class index i increases by 10
(the tail of the distribution is typically fitted to look for
a power law in the range from i = 15 to i = 25). The
rescaling factor to be applied to the discrete distribution
function xi is in this case proportional to the reciprocal
income r−1i ; this means that a power law tail maintains,
after rescaling, the same power law form, with an effective
Pareto index equal to the index of the xi augmented by 1.
3.3 A short survey of some wealth exchange models
To put our analysis into an historical prespective, we re-
call here that several mathematical models of wealth ex-
change processes display a Pareto tail in their equilibrium
solutions. In some cases the tail has only be observed nu-
merically, in others it is a part of an analytical solution.
In some models the Pareto index is a constant, in oth-
ers it depends on some parameters. Finally, some models
are conservative, the conserved quantity being the total
wealth; in others the total wealth increases in time.
For instance, the model by Bouchaud and Mezard [18],
originally developed in physics for the description of poly-
mers, admits (when the exchange rate J is the same for
all agents) an exact solution in the mean-field approxima-
tion. The distribution function is in that case an Amoroso
curve with a Pareto index α = 1+J/σ2 which depends on
the exchange rate J and on the variance σ of a Gaussian
multiplicative process appearing in the model equations.
The Gaussian process simulates investment dynamics and
is related to the temporal change in the value of the stocks
which, on the average, increases in time.
The model by Scafetta, West and Picozzi [19] is an
evolution of the model by Bouchaud and Mezard, which
takes into account several realistic details of the exchange
process. Its computer-generated wealth distribution func-
tions can be fitted by rational functions of the form f(x) =
axγ/(1 + bx)γ+δ, where the Pareto index is α = δ − 1.
In the model by Slanina [20], growing markets are mod-
eled by bringing in during each trading an extra amount of
wealth, which is proportional to the wealth of both agents
participating in the trading: this represents, realistically,
the fact that the rich can invest more, and with more re-
turn. One finds in this case a power law distribution for
the rich of the form f(x) ∼ x−1.7.
In the classical conservative model by Chatterjee, Cha-
krabarti and Manna [11], agents contribute only a frac-
tion of their wealth for trading, depending on their saving
propensities, which differ among agents. A Pareto tail is
found, of the form f(x) ∼ x−2.
Our model family somehow resembles that one by Chat-
terjee, Chakrabarti and Manna [11]. However, differently
from it, it allows to recover different Pareto indices (com-
pare e.g. results in [8] or see the data in the caption of the
Figure 4).
The question of taxation and redistribution was first
studied in [1], where it was modeled through a Boltzmann
equation. A different approach was developed in [21], en-
compassing two-step tradings, which consist of a wealth
exchange analogous to an inelastic binary “collision ”and
of a redistribution of the lost wealth (the taxes) among
the population. The effect of the subsidies by the gov-
ernment on the equilibrium distribution is shown in both
papers [1] and [21] to cause a shifting of the individu-
als from the lower income classes toward middle income
classes. Accordingly, and differently with respect to what
happens e.g. to Boltzmann-Gibbs distributions, the equi-
librium distribution is seen to exhibit a maximum. The
Figure 5 of [1] and the Figure 2 of [21] are qualitatively
similar to the figures of this paper with the histograms
representing the asymptotic equilibria.
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4 The κ distribution as a reasonable fit
When the equilibrium income distribution f(x) of a model
is found through numerical methods, it is customary to
characterize this function according to its general features
(e.g., monotonicity, presence of a maximum, value at zero)
and to compute some global statistical indices, as the vari-
ance, the Gini index, etc.. Finally, one tries to fit f(x) with
some known multi-parameter distribution.
It is well known, for instance, that reversible kinetic
systems evolve towards a Gibbs function, independently
from the details of the transition probabilities, while non-
reversible systems with fixed saving propensity evolve to-
wards a Gamma function. For systems with a Pareto power
law tail, four are, to our knowledge, the fit functions which
have been proposed in the literature: the Amoroso distri-
bution [22], the Pareto-Gompertz distribution [3], some
rational functions of the form f(x) = axγ/(1+bx)γ+δ[19],
and the κ-generalized distribution [14], [15], [16].
The Amoroso distribution
f(x) =
(α− 1)α
Γ (α)
e−
α−1
x
x1+α
contains one parameter and is the exact limit of the model
by Bouchaud and Mezard [18]. It is characterized by the
presence of a maximum, by a null value in zero (with ex-
ponential increase) and by a Pareto index α which is in-
dependent from the average income.
The Pareto-Gompertz distribution contains three in-
dependent parameters, is monotonically decreasing and
has a Pareto index which depends on the average income.
Its analytical expression is more complex: it is given by a
combination of a double exponential of the form f(x) =
BeA−Bxee
A−Bx
followed by a power tail. It has been suc-
cessfully employed e.g. in [3] for the description of real
statistical data from Brazil.
Rational functions of the form f(x) = axγ/(1+bx)γ+δ
are suggested by Scafetta, West and Picozzi in [19] as ap-
parently well fittings the computer-generated wealth dis-
tributions of their trade-investment model.
The κ-generalized distribution, given by
f(x) =
αβxα−1expκ(−βxα)√
1 + β2κ2x2α
, (8)
with the generalized exponential function
expκ(y) = (
√
1 + κ2y2 + κy)1/κ
was introduced by Kaniadakis in [14] in a general context.
In [15] and [16] it has been considered in connection with
its application to the economic problem of the representa-
tion of income distribution, with the parameters α, β > 0
and κ ∈ [0, 1). In that context, the variable x in (8) is
defined as x = z/〈z〉, with z the absolute personal income
and 〈z〉 its mean value. One of the interesting properties
that this probability density function enjoys is its behavior
for large values of x; indeed,
f(x) ∼ α
κ
(2β κ)−1/κ x−(
α
κ+1) for x→ +∞ .
The parameters α and β respectively determine the cur-
vature (shape) and the scale of the probability distribu-
tion. The parameter κ measures the fatness of the up-
per tail: the larger its magnitude is, the fatter the tail
is. The strength of the κ-generalized distribution stems
from its ability to reproduce in an excellent way empiri-
cal data of several countries (see [15] for data concerning
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and [16] for Australia,
United States).
Based on several attempts to fit the asymptotic sta-
tionary distributions resulting from our simulations with
one or the other of the mentioned analytical expressions,
we are in the position of claiming that the unique among
them which seems to be suitable for the purpose is the
κ-generalized distribution. In fact, it displays quite good
performances.
The Figure 4 illustrates in each of the two panel rows a
sample of three fittings out of many, relative to the three
Cases FSP, TID and FAE introduced in Section 3. The
average incomes are rj = 10j. The taxations rates τj are
taken differently in the simulations relative to the first and
to the second row. Specifically, in the simulations whose
asymptotic trend is shown in the first row, three taxation
rates are postulated, given by:
τj = 5/100 for j = 1, ..., 5 ,
τj = 25/100 for j = 6, ..., 20 ,
τj = 45/100 for j = 21, ..., 25 ,
while in the simulations relative to the second row the
taxation rates are as in (7). In each of the plots the hori-
zontal variable is given by x = z/〈z〉, with z the absolute
personal income and 〈z〉 its mean value and the vertical
variable representing the fraction of individual with a cer-
tain income is rescaled so as to have a distribution.
5 Some remarks on reversibility
According to general results of kinetic theory [6] any sys-
tem with reversible microscopic interactions approaches,
at equilibrium, a Gibbs distribution function (a pure expo-
nential). The reversibility condition is satisfied when the
probability of each inverse elementary interaction process
in the system is equal to the probability of the correspond-
ing direct process.
For our model family, a typical example of elementary
interaction with money exchange and taxation is shown
in Fig. 5 (see detailed discussion below). This interaction
is reversible in only one case among those described in
this paper, and more precisely only provided the following
three conditions are satisfied (see Table 1):
1. the parameters bkij are as in the Case FAE of the model
family, in which the exchanged amount is fixed and the
saving propensity is variable;
2. the class income values rj are linear in the class in-
dex j;
3. the taxation rates are set equal to zero.
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Fig. 4. In each of the two panel rows three fittings are illustrated of three asymptotic stationary distributions relative
to the three Cases FSP, TID, and FAE of Section 3 with the κ-generalized distribution. The taxations rates τj
are different in the simulations relative to the first and to the second row. The horizontal variable is defined as
x = z/〈z〉, with z the absolute personal income and 〈z〉 its mean value. The vertical variable is rescaled so as to have
a normalized distribution. The parameters α, β e κ of the κ-generalized distribution (8) are as follows. In the first row:
FSP: α = 2.9459, β = 0.7754, κ = 0.4426; TID: α = 1.5113, β = 1.0574, κ = 0.6156; FAE: α = 1.4601, β = 1.3008,
κ = 0.9952; in the second row: FSP: α = 2.8868, β = 0.7776, κ = 0.4342; TID: α = 1.5118, β = 1.0560, κ = 0.6138;
FAE: α = 1.3784, β = 1.2171, κ = 0.8664.
Let us analyse these three conditions in detail.
As for condition 1, it is well known [6] and easily re-
alised that wealth exchange processes with fixed saving
propensity are non-reversible. Such processes are present
in the Case FSP of our model, where phk = (1/4) rh/rn. In
Case TID, where phk = (1/4) min{rh/rk}/rn, the interac-
tion is also non-reversible, because the quantity min{rh/rk}
is in general different in the direct process and in the in-
verse process.
In connection with condition 2, we notice that the in-
come differences |ri− ri−1| in the denominators of the pa-
rameters bihk in (2) are independent from the index i only
if ri is linear in i. Otherwise, the income differences de-
pend on income, being typically larger for the rich classes.
It follows that also in that case the probabilities of the
direct and inverse wealth exchange processes are not the
same.
Finally, about condition 3, even assuming that the con-
ditions conditions 1 and 2 hold true, we have irreversibility
due to the taxation process. This can be grasped by look-
ing at the Figure 5, which is supposed to refer to Case
FAE of our model family, with linear class incomes. The
first diagram shows an example of an interaction between
a “rich”agent (belonging to the 20-th income class) and
a “poor”agent (6-th class). In this case the poor agent
pays an amount S and acquires a definite probability to
pass to the lower class. The rich agent gains an amount S
minus the taxes and acquires a probability to pass to the
higher class. The taxes are distributed among all the other
agents, giving each of them a (small) probability of transi-
tion to their upper classes. The second diagram represents
the inverse process, where the rich agent pays the poor
agent and thus acquires a probability to pass to the lower
class. Plainly, if the rich and the poor are subjected to dif-
ferent taxation rates, then the two diagrams have different
probabilities and the whole process is non-reversible. But
even if the taxation rate is the same, the whole process
is non-reversible, because there exists no way for all the
other agents to give the tax money back. In other words,
the exchange of the amount S can be reversed, but not
the “small redistributions” of the tax on S.
Hence, calculating the distribution function of our mo-
del in Case FAE, with linear income classes and no taxes,
provides an important cross-check of the model and of the
numerical solutions: we expect in this case to obtain the
pure Gibbs distribution predicted by kinetic theory for
reversible processes. And this is, actually, what is found:
one obtains an exponential distribution, except for the
first and last classes, whose wealth exchanges are non-
reversible due to boundary effects.
In this connection we also recall that the initial condi-
tions play in general a role in the equilibrium approach to
a Gibbs distribution: such an equilibrium distribution can
be reached in a conservative system only if the initial con-
ditions do not display a population inversion correspond-
ing to negative temperature. In our case this is guaranteed
by the choice of an initial population concentrated in the
classes with low income (compare Section 3).
The emergence, in the reversible case without taxes, of
a purely exponential distribution is at the same time nat-
ural and puzzling. One can naturally expect, in fact, that
the removal of taxes causes an increase in the population
of the poorest at the detriment of the middle classes, as
it happens in the exponential distribution. On the other
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Fig. 5. Example of non-reversible process with taxes. The
first diagram shows an example of an interaction between
a “rich”agent (belonging to the 20-th income class) and
a “poor”agent (6-th class). In this case the poor agent
pays an amount S and acquires a definite probability to
pass to the lower class. The rich agent gains an amount S
minus the taxes and acquires a probability to pass to the
higher class. The taxes are distributed among all the other
agents, giving each of them a (small) probability of transi-
tion to their upper classes. The second diagram represents
the inverse process, where the rich agent pays the poor
agent and thus acquires a probability to pass to the lower
class. Suppose that the two alternatives “6 pays 20”and
“21 pays 5”have the same probability. If the rich and the
poor are subjected to different taxation rates, then the two
diagrams have different probabilities and the whole pro-
cess is clearly non-reversible. But even if the taxation rate
is the same, the whole process is non-reversible, because
there exists no way for all the other agents to give the tax
money back. In other words, the exchange of the amount
S can be reversed, but not the “small re-distributions”of
the tax on S.
hand, the exponential tail is thinner than the power law
tail of the (non-reversible) distribution with taxes, and the
reason for this is less obvious. Things go as if the complete
reversibility of the wealth exchange would make it harder
for the super-rich to preserve their wealth.
We close this section recalling that we pointed out
in Section 3 a similarity between the Case FAE (with a
fixed exchanged amount of money) of our model family
and some models without taxes and with variable saving
propensity ([11], see also [12] and [13]). We observed that
our fixed exchanged amount of money mimics a saving
propensity which varies among agents belonging to differ-
ent classes and that in both cases a Pareto tail is found.
Since, however, the removal of the taxes from our model
causes the Pareto tail to disappear, one should conclude
that the dynamical mechanism behind the formation of
the tail is different in the two cases.
Table 1. Summary of results. The three basic model cases
considered in this paper (first column) and their further
subdivision/specialization according to taxation and lin-
ear/nonlinear class incomes. The last two columns record
the appearence of reversibility and power law tails. Notice
that linear class incomes in general do not allow to distin-
guish clearly between a power law tail and an exponential
tail.
Model Income Reversibility Fat tail
linear no ?
FSP with taxes
non-lin. no no
linear no ?
FSP, no taxes
non-lin. no no
linear no ?
TID with taxes
non-lin. no yes
linear no ?
TID, no taxes
non-lin. no yes
linear no ?
FAE with taxes
non-lin. no yes
linear yes no
FAE, no taxes
non-lin. no yes
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper is to provide further insight into the
formation process of stationary income profiles. A family
of models introduced in [9] and [8] has been investigated.
In particular, the high flexibility of these models (related
to the wide range of possible parameter choices) has been
exploited for the construction of various examples. A com-
parison between different long time behaviors exhibited
by those examples contributes to further understanding
of the mechanisms responsible for the emergence of one or
the other output. Attention has also been given to plac-
ing our results within a frame of related results obtained
through different methods.
Our approach for the description of the process of
wealth exchange in the presence of taxation comprises a
subdivision of the population into income classes, and a
corresponding discretization of the distribution function.
This approach has proven to be powerful in its application.
It translates well-tested physical methods of kinetic the-
ory into a manageable mathematical framework (a system
of ordinary differential equations) which can be quickly
solved numerically with standard software. The micro-
scopic interaction parameters as well as the taxation rates
have a straightforward interpretation and can be easily
varied. This allows to reproduce the qualitative results of
several different models.
In particular, in correspondence to some parameter
choices, stationary distributions have been found, whose
higher income sections exhibit a power law decreasing be-
havior. It could be argued in this connection that properly
talking of power law tails requires treating the income
or wealth variable as a continuous one taking values in
[0,+∞). This is for example what is done in papers like
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[5] and [13], where a rigorous analytical approach is devel-
oped, which includes the study of the evolution of the mo-
ments of the solution. Certainly, admitting a finite number
of income classes entails some unnatural constraint and
causes some boundary effect as well. On the other hand,
we think that for the application-oriented problem at is-
sue this is not so out of place: typically, in reports and
studies concerning real world populations, income distri-
butions are never infinitely extended, a finite number of
income bins are taken into consideration, and of course,
statements concerning the power law decreasing behavior
are not to be intended in a strictly analytical way. We
rather observe that for a more credible depiction of mod-
ern market economies, more relevant corrections should
be incorporated in the model, the first one being proba-
bly the introduction of a term accounting for a possible
generation of wealth due to production efficiency increase.
In fact, the conservation of the total wealth is not a real-
istic assumption.
We are very far from thinking and claiming that the
models investigated here can be employed to explain in a
satisfactory way real world situations. However, they may
provide a starting point for further progress in this direc-
tion. The reason for their interest, we think, is given by
their flexibility and ability of reproducing the emergence
of qualitative global features based only on the description
of the micro-level interactions. And this is one of the main
challenges in a complex systems approach.
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